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British Labour Party education policy and comprehensive education:  From 
Learning to Live to Circular 10/65 
 
1. Introduction 
Circular 10/65, ‘The organisation of secondary education’, was produced by the 
Department of Education and Science (DES) in Britain on 12 July 1965, and was sent 
to all local education authorities (LEAs) and the governors of direct grant, voluntary 
aided and special agreement schools.1  It is a slight document, only eleven pages in 
length, but its appearance is deceptive.  Many commentators then and since have 
recognised its seminal importance to the history of education in Britain since the 
Second World War, and to the spread of comprehensive schools.  Fifty years after its 
initial circulation, the current article seeks to trace the idea of comprehensive 
education from the 1940s to the 1960s, to understand the position of Labour Party 
education policy in its development, and to assess the nature of the contribution of 
Circular 10/65 itself to comprehensive education in Britain. 
Through this Circular, the secretary of state for education and science requested 
LEAs, if they had not already done so, to prepare and submit to him plans for 
reorganising secondary education in their areas on comprehensive lines. Like other 
Circulars in the British system of local government, it was designed to offer non-
statutory guidance rather than legal sanction.2  Its expressed purpose was to ‘provide 
some central guidance on the methods by which this can be achieved’.3  It noted that 
there were several ways in which comprehensive education could be organised, and 
identified six main forms of comprehensive organisation that had been developed so 
far.  There was first what it described as the orthodox comprehensive school with an 
age range of 11-18.  Secondly, there was a two-tier system in which all pupils 
transferred first at 11 to a junior comprehensive school and then at 13 or 14 to a senior 
3 
 
 
comprehensive school.  Third, it noted a system in which all pupils would transfer to a 
junior comprehensive school at 11, but then only some would transfer to a senior 
school while the remainder stayed on in the same school.  Fourth, it recognised 
another kind of two-tier approach in which all pupils on leaving primary school 
transferred to a junior comprehensive school, but then at the age of 13 or 14 all pupils 
had a choice between a senior school that catered for those who expected to stay at 
school well beyond the compulsory age, and a senior school catering for those who 
did not.  A fifth system was that of comprehensive schools with an age range of 11 to 
16 combined with sixth form colleges for pupils over 16.  Finally, there was a system 
of middle schools which would be comprehensives for pupils from 8 to 12, or 9 to 13, 
then proceeding to a comprehensive with an age range of 12 or 13 to 18.  It 
acknowledged that the most appropriate system would depend on local 
circumstances, and that an LEA might decide to adopt more than one form of 
organisation.  It regarded the first, second, fifth and sixth of these identified types of 
organisation as fully comprehensive, but the third and fourth as not fully 
comprehensive because they involved the separation of children of different aims and 
aptitudes into different schools at the age of 13 or 14, and were thus only an interim 
stage in a development towards a fully comprehensive secondary organisation.4 
Several useful studies of Circular 10/65 have been produced, including contributions 
by Dennis Dean and David Crook.5  These have established the general background 
to the Circular, with Dean in particular emphasising the part played by Anthony 
Crosland, the responsible secretary of state at the time that it was introduced. A key 
paper remains that of Brian Simon, who in 1992 published a retrospective analysis of 
the politics of comprehensive reorganisation. 6   Simon argued that, unlike their 
opponents, the supporters of comprehensive reorganisation lacked what he described 
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as ‘clarity of purpose, unwavering determination and above all political will’.7  For 
Simon, Circular 10/65 vividly exemplified this problem because it merely requested 
LEAs to submit plans for comprehensive education, rather than requiring them to do 
so.  He concluded that ‘One outcome of this decision may be that we still do not have 
universal comprehensive education in England a generation (27 years) later.’8  Thus, 
according to Simon, the fundamental historical question to explain was the Labour 
Party’s lack of political will or strength of purpose that expressed itself in particular in 
relation to comprehensive education.   
On one level, the current paper seeks clues to address the issue that Simon raised in 
his paper of 1992.  It is able to pursue this partly because of the fuller perspective that 
the past two decades have provided on the historical experience of comprehensive 
education in the English context.  This period has witnessed the further growth of 
challenges to comprehensive schools and an emphasis on choice, diversity and 
selection that have culminated in the academies and free school movements.9  As 
Crook notes, ‘Though no death certificate or body to bury has emerged, the orderliness 
of historical periodization may now demand that “the comprehensive era” should take 
its place alongside “the Revised Code era”, “the school board era” and “the era of 
child-centredness”.’10   This in turn suggests that the high tide of comprehensive 
education as a national policy, in the 1960s, may have been transitory and exceptional 
rather than part of a steady evolution to a new order in the English context, and that 
the system was now beginning to revert to its former emphasis on localism and 
difference, albeit in a radically changed context of experiments in public-private 
partnerships, school specialisation, and neoliberal market-based initiatives.11 
The passage of time also permits fresh perspectives on the phase of educational 
policy that preceded the advance of comprehensive education, the period of reform 
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ushered in by the Education Act of 1944.  There have been several substantial 
treatments of the Act itself and of aspects of the debates that preceded it.12  The new 
policy regime underpinned by the Education Reform Act of 1988 offered a different 
contemporary context by which to evaluate the significance of the 1944 Act.13  The 
delayed and longer-term effects of the 1944 Act are now also coming under increasing 
scrutiny.  For example, a recent detailed study has documented the delayed 
implementation of the raising of the school leaving age to 16, which was introduced in 
1972 after being proposed in the legislation of 1944.  This research has also been able 
to show how this reform helped to create the conditions for the rise of mass higher 
education later in the century, which then was followed by a further increase in the 
educational participation age to 18 under the Education and Skills Act of 2008.14  The 
current article seeks to review the development of the contested notion of 
comprehensive education from the debates that led initially to the 1944 Act through to 
Circular 10/65 over two decades later, in order to trace the connections between them. 
With the further passage of time, it is also becoming possible to reflect on issues that 
were once matters of intense partisanship.  The postwar period was formative and of 
lasting historical significance for the development of social institutions such as 
education, with implications that endured well into the twenty-first century.  It continues 
to evoke sharp memories on the part of those who lived through these decades and 
took part in these events.  However, we can now start to treat this period with a 
measure of historical perspective and critical detachment, while imagining the context 
in which different individuals and groups sought to engage with and influence this 
debate.  In doing so, we need to understand not only the enthusiasm of activists and 
the dedication to particular causes shown by the career politician or the local advocate, 
but also the attitudes and opinions of communities in a broader sense.  In this particular 
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case, it is the relationship between politicians and policy makers on one hand and 
‘public opinion’ on the other, that starts to come into sharper relief. 
Another way in which we are now able to revisit the arguments in Simon’s 1992 paper 
is through methodological advancement.  Simon was mainly confined to published 
accounts of comprehensive education, although he was himself closely involved in the 
debates around it.15  He was aware that Michael Stewart, briefly the secretary of state 
for education and science before Anthony Crosland was appointed to the position in 
January 1965, might be able to help explain these events, and planned to meet him to 
discuss them, but, as he recalled, ‘unfortunately, just as I began to make 
arrangements, he became seriously ill and shortly after died’. 16   He had lost a 
potentially valuable source of evidence; ‘That source has gone for ever’, he 
lamented.17   This proved not to be entirely the case, however, as Stewart left a 
substantial archive which was deposited at Churchill College Cambridge.  Moreover, 
Simon’s own archive was left to the Institute of Education London after his death in 
2002.  Such personal archives, supplementing the records at the National Archive in 
Kew, London, make it possible to reconstruct the arguments around comprehensive 
education that went on behind the scenes as opposed to in the public spotlight.18  
Public opinion polls have also become a source of interest to historians, both in the 
sense of being historical sources of information about public opinion and for their role 
in political decision making, and the archive of Mark Abrams, also at Churchill College 
Cambridge, provides further relevant insights on these issues.19  
These records highlight in particular Stewart’s mediating role in the development of 
the idea of comprehensive education, and connections with the debates within the 
Labour Party over education policy when he was shadow secretary of state for 
education in the late 1950s.  It was during this period that the Labour Party had 
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produced a significant policy statement on education entitled Learning to Live.20  Very 
little has been written about this policy episode, and its potential significance has been 
rarely understood.  Keith Fenwick’s early study of the spread of comprehensive 
schools was aware of a Labour Party study group to prepare this policy statement, but 
commented that within the group ‘the comprehensive school policy seems to have 
produced no dissension’.21   Denis Lawton’s more recent history of Labour Party 
education policy appears unaware of this group or of any arguments around it, and 
goes so far as to claim that the years between 1951 and 1964 were ‘squandered in as 
much as too little re-thinking about education had taken place’.22  Nirmala Rao’s 
discussion of arguments around selection and the neighbourhood school refers to 
Learning to Live but scarcely mentions Simon’s work.23  There was in fact significant 
re-thinking of education within the Labour Party at this time, including vigorous 
arguments within and around its study group leading to the publication of Learning to 
Live, which was one of many groups and sub-committees established by Labour’s 
national executive committee to review particular areas of policy.  It was indeed this 
debate, and Stewart’s involvement in it, that provided much of the basis for Circular 
10/65.  Moreover, this Labour Party policy discussion of 1957-1958 itself owed much 
to the ideas, values and policies established by the Education Act of 1944.  It therefore 
provides a potential link between the 1944 Act and Circular 10/65.   
Focusing on the Labour Party education policy group of 1957-58 and Learning to Live 
also reminds us of the political and social context of that period.  The Labour Party 
had lost the general election held in 1955, and Hugh Gaitskell was elected as the new 
party leader.24  By 1957, as the Conservative government put in place a new prime 
minister, Harold Macmillan, and as economic prosperity began to improve, the 
electoral prospects of the Labour Party appeared to be poor.  Gaitskell was convinced 
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that the party required radical changes to its policies and social outlook if it were ever 
to regain power, and began to promote a new approach that was soon styled as 
‘revisionist’.25  This was intended to break with previous policies and to make the party 
electable through cultivating ideas that engaged with contemporary social changes. 
With this aim in view, a series of study groups was set up to develop statements in 
different areas of social policy.  At the same time, a more scientific approach was 
beginning to be taken of gauging the public mood through the systematic use of public 
opinion polls, already familiar if not infallible in the USA.26  Opinion polling was being 
slowly integrated into British politics during the 1950s, despite some resistance, and 
Gaitskell was particularly interested in using this new device to test the popularity of 
his party’s policies.27  It was the combination of these two new factors, revisionism and 
public opinion polls, that was to help to calibrate Labour’s policies on comprehensive 
education and led eventually to Circular 10/65. 
2. The legacy of the 1944 Education Act 
The debate leading to the Education Act of 1944 began to reveal emerging attitudes 
towards comprehensive schools.  In general, the politicians and policy makers 
responsible for developing the Act were reluctant to move in this direction.  The 
reasons given for this reluctance included a belief that children’s capacities and 
interests were too diverse to justify housing them within a single type of school, a view 
that they had been tried and failed elsewhere, a preference for freedom and variety in 
education, and an assumption that ‘public opinion’ was not yet ready for such a 
development.  The 1944 Act itself did not commit itself to putting in place any specific 
kind of institution or organisation of secondary education, but the arrangements that it 
did make were nevertheless crucial for further developments in this area and thus had 
a lasting legacy. 
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Even before the start of the Second World War, an inquiry by the Board of Education’s 
consultative committee on secondary education generated discussion about future 
possibilities.  One key Board official, Robert Wood, pointed out in 1937 that provision 
of academic grammar school education had more than doubled since 1914, and 
suggested that this growth might have been ‘overdone’, since ‘something different is 
wanted for many children’.28  Wood insisted, moreover, that ‘This is not merely a 
bureaucratic view.  Headmasters are known to admit that they have a number of 
misfits, and Local Education Authorities are themselves beginning to suggest that 
some alternative form of “Secondary School” is needed for many pupils.’29  For this 
reason, he argued, each child should be given the education that was best adapted to 
their capacities:  ‘To attempt to put children through the same mental mill would be as 
stupid and dangerous a proceeding as to put all children through the same physical 
training without any consideration of their differing degrees of height or strength of 
physique.’30  These ideas about individual differences lay at the heart of the Spens 
report on secondary education, which concluded that different types of secondary 
school should be established to cater for such differences.31 
From 1941 onwards, as reform proposals began to be developed in detail, there was 
some support for comprehensive schools, or what were often called ‘multilateral’ 
schools that combined different types of education, or ‘common’ schools designed to 
cater for all pupils over eleven years of age.  The president of the board of education, 
R.A. Butler, was aware of this approach, and was prepared to accept that ‘logically’ 
there was ‘a great deal to be said’ in its favour.32  His objections to it were based first 
on his preference for freedom and variety in education, and secondly in his sense of 
the state of public opinion.  He pointed out that ‘in framing educational policy I am 
continually inspired by relics of the belief that we are a free country’.  Moreover, he 
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added, ‘If we were to force every child into one type of school it would be one thing, 
but there is the risk that the law would be got round and people would start up a series 
of private schools, less satisfactory than those existing at present’.  He was also 
concerned that it would not be practicable for legislation supporting common schools 
to be carried through Parliament. 33   This was a pragmatic acceptance that the 
Conservative majority in the House of Commons, and the prime minister Winston 
Churchill, would be most unlikely to countenance such a policy.34  His permanent 
secretary, Sir Maurice Holmes, was equally cautious, although he was also conscious 
of a widespread demand for social equality that had been stimulated by the War:  ‘I 
should say that the Common School is bound to come sooner or later, but whether 
public opinion will be ripe for it at the end of the war it is impossible to say.’35  At this 
time there were few reliable means of discerning in any precise fashion what the state 
of public opinion actually was, especially since the last general election had been held 
in very different circumstances in 1935, but it was a significant element in the 
development of educational reform. 
The common school approach was strongly resisted by the veteran educator Sir Cyril 
Norwood, appointed to chair a committee with the remit to review the curriculum and 
examinations in secondary schools.  The first meeting of his committee worked from 
the assumption that there would be a diversity of secondary schools including 
grammar schools, technical schools and modern schools, and that ‘the tradition of 
secondary education, the best in the world, must be preserved’.36  At the same time, 
Norwood suggested that there should be a common curriculum in all kinds of 
secondary school from the age of eleven to thirteen.37  Several months later, Norwood 
met the president of the board of education, R.A. Butler, to review progress.  As Butler 
noted, Norwood asked Butler ‘whether the Common School question was coming to 
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the front and said there was growing support for it’.38  Norwood himself argued on this 
occasion that ‘it would take twenty years to introduce such a reform satisfactorily’, and 
to support this pointed out that France had found it difficult to introduce this reform in 
1934.39   Butler ‘entirely agreed’, commenting that ‘reforms such as the Common 
School and raising the age to sixteen must follow upon an improvement in the schools 
into which we desired to introduce such changes’.40 
It was notable also that Sir Percival Sharp, the secretary of the Association of 
Education Committees which represented LEAs, and a member of the Norwood 
committee, fully supported these views, as least as reported by Norwood.  According 
to Norwood, indeed, following a two-hour discussion with him, Sharp ‘spits on 
multilateralism, having been to America’.41   Norwood enlarged somewhat on this 
assertion in a further note to Butler:  ‘He is all against multi-lateralism.  He has seen it 
in New York and elsewhere.  He does not believe in the multilateral headmaster.’42  
This was intriguing evidence that the American experience of the high school for all 
was not fully convincing on the other side of the Atlantic. 
These attitudes and concerns were reflected in the Education White Paper, 
Educational Reconstruction, published in July 1943, and in the Norwood Report, 
Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools, published ten days later.  Both 
documents set out new arrangements for secondary education framed around three 
different types of secondary school – grammar, technical and modern.  The White 
Paper noted that ‘It would be wrong to suppose that they will necessarily remain 
separate and apart.  Different types may be combined in one building or on one site 
as considerations of convenience and efficiency may suggest.  In any case the free 
interchange of pupils from one type of education to another must be facilitated.’43  On 
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the other hand, the Norwood report explicitly associated each of these institutions with 
different ‘types of mind’.44   
The Education Act of 1944 did not itself endorse these sentiments, but it did set in 
place a number of key provisions that were to be no less significant in subsequent 
years.   First, there would be a new Ministry of Education, under a Minister whose duty 
would be ‘to provide the education of the people of England and Wales and the 
progressive development of institutions devoted to that purpose, and to secure the 
effective execution by local authorities, under his control and direction, of the national 
policy for providing a varied and comprehensive education service in every area’.45  
This asserted the need for a national policy in education, for which the Minister of 
Education would be responsible, but it also highlighted the central role of LEAs in its 
execution.  It would be the duty of the LEA to ensure that efficient primary, secondary 
and further education was available to serve the needs of the population of the area.46  
They were to do so by preparing a development plan for their area and submitting it to 
the Ministry.47  Third, while religious instruction and an act of collective worship would 
be compulsory in all schools, secular instruction would be under the control of the LEA 
rather than that of the Minister.48  There was in these provisions a particular mixture 
of central control and local responsibility.  The Ministry controlled the overall 
framework, but LEAs could interpret the specific needs of their own area.  This was 
notably the case with the development plans.  In relation to secondary education, while 
the Ministry of Education followed the tripartite approach of the Norwood Report, many 
LEAs made their own choices to define the nature of provision in their own area in 
their own way.49   
In general, then, the discussions that led to the Education Act of 1944, and the regime 
that the Act underpinned, together created the context for arguments around 
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comprehensive education.  Officials, politicians and reformers harboured doubts about 
comprehensive education based on their understandings of individual differences, the 
importance of freedom and diversity, the tradition of secondary education, the lessons 
of overseas experience, and the state of public opinion.  The Act itself promoted the 
idea of national policy but created an elaborate system of localised discretion.  These 
ingredients provided a powerful legacy for the subsequent debate both in general 
terms and within the Labour Party. 
3. The Labour debate over the comprehensive schools  
After the War, a Labour government was in office from 1945 until 1951, with two 
ministers of education in succession in Ellen Wilkinson and George Tomlinson.  
Neither showed any interest in comprehensive education, preferring to try to support 
the new secondary modern schools as a proper alternative to the established grammar 
schools for non-academic pupils.50  Discussions over the merits of comprehensive 
education continued during this period. 51  The debate that ensued after Labour 
returned to Opposition in October 1951, culminating in the policy statement Learning 
to Live, established the broad approach for the Labour government that came to power 
in 1964. 
The debate over the comprehensive school resumed in the broader context of internal 
Labour Party conflicts between the followers of Aneurin Bevan, the Welsh left-wing 
leader, and the rising right-wing Labour politician Hugh Gaitskell.  The Bevanites were 
committed to pursuing further socialist change to build on the achievements of the 
Labour government, while Gaitskell counselled caution and moderation.  Education 
policy began to be caught up in this wider struggle.  In 1953, a strong policy statement 
produced by Labour’s National Executive Committee, Challenge to Britain, committed 
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itself to ending the eleven-plus examination and the different types of schools in 
secondary education, in favour of all children between the ages of eleven and fifteen 
sharing the academic and social benefits of one secondary school.52  However, this 
left the principle of comprehensive education for children over fifteen unresolved, and 
Norman Morris on behalf of the National Association of Labour Teachers succeeded 
in having this part of the proposals referred back for further discussion at the 1953 
Labour Party conference, held in Margate. 53   At the same time, the Party was 
committed to what the Times Educational Supplement, no friend to comprehensive 
education in this period, as an ‘infinitely costly distraction’.54   
There were clear differences within the parliamentary Labour Party in terms of defining 
a viable way forward.  For example, Fred Blackburn, recently elected as Member of 
Parliament (MP) for Stalybridge and Hyde and a member of the party’s parliamentary 
sub-committee on education policy, argued that it was not possible to establish 
effective comprehensive schools with appropriate facilities and staffing all over the 
country.  He concluded that ‘Since the provision of a network of such schools covering 
the whole country would take probably half a century, we are bound to look to 
alternative solutions.’55  Blackburn also invoked the idea of public opinion in resisting 
the wholesale application of comprehensive education:  ‘It would not be enough if 
every member of the Labour Party thoroughly understood the scheme and accepted 
it unreservedly; we shall still have to carry the electorate with us.’  Moreover, he 
observed the potential dangers of ‘compulsion’ and the need to allow for ‘variety’ of 
organisation.56  These were arguments that had already been familiar to the architects 
of the 1944 Act.  Charles Pannell, MP for Leeds West since 1949, supported these 
views.  On the other hand, Alice Bacon, another Leeds MP on the right wing of the 
party, was a strong advocate of comprehensive schools, while another right-winger, 
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Freda Corbett, dissociated herself from Blackburn’s comments which she dismissed 
as being ‘tantamount to a postponement of Labour’s plans for an indefinite number of 
years’. 57   Indeed, Corbett argued as early as March 1954 that ‘Local Education 
Authorities should be asked to formulate plans to be brought into being within a short 
number of years for the abolition of selection at 11+’.58  Nevertheless, it was already 
clear that a rapid movement towards comprehensive education on a national scale 
would be a very heavy financial and logistical commitment.  At the same time, if 
comprehensive schools were introduced in the same buildings and locations as 
existing schools, they might reflect current social differences between localities.  
Labour MPs were also keenly conscious of the arrangements under the 1944 Act in 
which the Ministry of Education had limited powers in a partnership with the LEAs.59 
A second general election defeat in 1955 and the subsequent election of Hugh 
Gaitskell as Labour Party leader changed the balance of this internal debate.  Gaitskell 
was convinced that in order to win the next election, Labour would need to revise its 
policies to be more in tune with the views of ordinary voters.  His ‘revisionist’ approach 
rejected public ownership as a first principle in favour of a mixed economy, and he 
preferred to support general principles of social equality, cooperation and political 
freedom, with freedom if anything placed ahead of equality.60  In education, he chose 
as shadow minister Michael Stewart, MP for Fulham, whom he had known since they 
were both undergraduates at the University of Oxford in the 1920s.61  The Oxford 
connection was strengthened with the active participation of Margaret Cole, wife of the 
Oxford political scientist G.D.H. Cole, who had known both Gaitskell and Stewart as 
undergraduates.62  Margaret Cole’s views struck a chord with the revisionist views of 
Gaitskell and Stewart.  She supported the principle of the common or comprehensive 
school,63 but was highly critical, as she told Gaitskell in a letter that was sent on to 
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Stewart, of what she described as ‘the very airy cloud-cuckoo-land talk of many in our 
Party – and the TUC [Trades Union Congress] spokesmen – about what we would do 
in 1960, without any real conception of (a) finance, (b) manpower’.  She added:  ‘I am 
afraid that Labour LEAs may be expected, under a Labour Government, to do things 
which no one has given them the means to do.’64  It was essential, she concluded, to 
avoid ‘a lot of promises and pie that just can’t be fulfilled’.65 
This view also chimed with the broader sentiments expressed in Anthony Crosland’s 
book The Future of Socialism, published in 1956.  This was a vigorous expression of 
socialist aspirations for the next generation, and resonated widely.  It emphasised the 
importance of education, criticising the school system as remaining ‘the most divisive, 
unjust, and wasteful of all the aspects of social inequality’.66  It opposed selection at 
the age of eleven, and favoured a system of comprehensive schools. At the same 
time, it recognised that the current system inherited an elaborate non-comprehensive 
structure, and therefore acknowledged that the Labour Party ‘could never impose a 
comprehensive system rapidly on the entire country’.67  Also, as Crosland pointed out, 
there was a high degree of local autonomy; only a minority of LEAs currently favoured 
comprehensive schools, ‘and no one proposes that the remainder should be 
coerced’. 68   A Labour Government should therefore state a preference for the 
comprehensive principle and ‘should actively encourage local authorities – and such 
advice carries great weight – to be more audacious in experimenting with 
comprehensive schools’.69 
This pragmatic approach to the issues involved, with its awareness of practicalities, 
was also rooted in the educational regime ushered in by the 1944 Act.  In particular, 
the autonomy of LEAs and teachers was widely viewed as being sacrosanct, to the 
extent that it was generally agreed that reforms should not be imposed upon them.  
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Stewart therefore deemed it necessary to recommend a ‘continuous use of all the 
instruments of persuasion which are at the Ministry’s disposal to encourage the 
advance of the comprehensive principle’,70 rather than compulsion.  Stewart and Cole 
reminded colleagues in a joint memorandum that ‘a Labour Government, desiring to 
influence the content of education, must be content to use the means of persuasion, 
of which of course the most powerful is financial persuasion’. There were many ways 
of bringing influence to bear, they argued, but ‘direct compulsion, or any threat of it, 
would be disastrous’.71 
A further obstacle was financial.  In 1957, the total annual expenditure on education 
was approaching £500 million.  Over the next decade, it was anticipated that there 
would be a population ‘bulge’ for schools to cater for, a need to reduce the size of 
classes especially in primary schools, an extension of education for fifteen to eighteen 
year olds whether or not the school leaving age was raised to sixteen as the 1944 Act 
had originally intended, a further move towards replacing slum school premises and 
improving equipment, and an expansion in technical education.  The combination of 
these trends might easily take educational expenditure to £700 million or even more.  
A wholesale introduction of comprehensive schools in all areas would add greatly to 
this expense.  Stewart and Cole argued that it would be essential for the success of a 
comprehensive school that it should be established in a ‘new, handsome, well-
equipped building’, with adequate equipment and staff from a wide range of 
backgrounds.  However, they warned, it would be ‘impossible’ to fulfil these 
requirements by building new schools for all children of secondary school age in the 
next five or ten years. In these circumstances, they added, it would be necessary to 
find alternative solutions.  It might be possible, for example, to group neighbouring 
schools, or to place sixth form pupils in a junior college.72 
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One innovative reformer who came forward with an alternative plan of this kind was 
Robin Pedley, a lecturer in education based at Leicester University.  Pedley argued 
that all pupils should go on to attend a county college at the age of fifteen rather than 
some staying on in school to go into the sixth form.  Such an arrangement, he 
proposed, ‘would give true comprehensive education to all our young men and women, 
enabling workers in industry and classroom to understand each other as no school 
can enable them to do’.73  His scheme attracted interest and support in many quarters, 
including for example in Leicestershire, and from local education officers such as 
Wearing King in Croydon.74   
Thus, the Labour Party in opposition began to identify a viable approach to the further 
development of ‘secondary education for all’.  This was all the more important as the 
Conservative government reelected in 1955 sought to consolidate the educational 
arrangements that it had inherited from the 1944 Act.75  The minister of education, Sir 
David Eccles, was aware of Labour’s growing interest in comprehensive education, 
and set out to respond to this with the recognition that education would need to be 
treated as ‘the most urgent of all social problems’ over the next decade.76  He regarded 
education as an area of policy that could persuade ‘erstwhile Labour voters’ to defect 
politically to the ‘Tory Middle Class’, but acknowledged a danger that what he regarded 
as the Conservatives’ ‘splendid record’ on education might be forgotten as the public 
demanded ‘an ever growing rate of quantity and quality’.77  The political stakes were 
therefore high as both of the main parties set out their respective agendas for the 
future of secondary education. 
4. The Labour Party study group on education 
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These issues came to the fore in the study group on education that was established 
by the Labour Party in 1957.  Stewart and Cole advised the group before its first 
meeting that the difficulties involved in requiring all LEAs to abandon selection and 
segregation at 11-plus and transforming all of their secondary schools into 
comprehensive schools had not been closely examined, suggesting moreover that ‘it 
is for consideration how far, and by what methods, the principle of comprehensive 
secondary education can best be promoted in the light of practical difficulties and of 
the need to respect the rights of local authorities’.78  The limiting factors, as they noted, 
were ‘teachers, buildings and money’.79  They also emphasised that in order to enjoy 
sufficient public support to bring about a nationwide shift towards comprehensive 
schools it would be crucial to provide more explanation of and propaganda for this 
policy, both within the Labour Party and among the general public.80  In short, they 
concluded, the Labour Party was at present ‘committed to a wholesale and rapid 
implementation of the comprehensive principle which takes little account of actual 
conditions and possibilities’.81  A further memorandum to the group the following 
month stressed and underlined the point that it would be ‘physically impossible to 
create comprehensive schools throughout the country on the “orthodox” lines outlined 
above’.82 
Considerable discussion of these issues ensued at the third meeting of the study group 
on 16 July.  It was eventually decided, first, that there should not be selection of 
children at the age of eleven into different types of secondary schools; second, that 
the aim of Labour’s education policy would be to promote ‘in every possible way’ the 
reorganisation of secondary education to ensure that all children had access to the 
courses most suitable to their abilities and aptitudes; and third, that a future Labour 
government would not need to pass a major new Education Act, ‘but that the present 
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1944 Act could be used to bring about the reorganisation required’.83  These were key 
decisions, partly for ensuring that the 1944 Act would have a delayed legacy in this 
area, but also for the basic tenets of Labour’s future policy.  The study group also 
accepted that ‘there was no need to impose on LEAs a uniform method of 
implementing the principle of non selection into separate types of schools, but that the 
new secondary schools, catering for children between the ages of 11 and 18, could be 
organised in a variety of ways, depending on local wishes and circumstances’.84  A 
future Labour Minister of Education would not be expected to compel LEAs to 
reorganise their schools, but a financial inducement might be provided, and LEAs 
would be asked rather than directed to submit proposals for reorganisation.85 
A further set of issues arose in relation to finding out the state of public opinion on 
comprehensive education.  Although ’public opinion’ had often been invoked, it was 
only in the 1950s that this began to be identified on a scientific basis through the use 
of public opinion polls.  The Labour Party was now commissioning Mark Abrams, the 
managing director of Research Services Ltd, to conduct such polls in particular areas 
of policy.  Abrams himself was confident that ‘society is adding to its resources a set 
of tools whereby public opinion can be reliably measured and appreciated’.86  He was 
invited to provide an education survey and to discuss his report with the study group.87  
This he did at the end of the year, with findings that were highly disconcerting.  Abrams  
argued that the sample used for the survey was ‘reasonably representative’, although 
he acknowledged that it was relatively small, comprising 400 men and women in all 
who were aged between 30 and 49 years old and the parents of children between 5 
and 16.88  He had found that education for their children was of little consequence to 
most working class parents, who were generally content to leave matters as they were.  
Moreover, the idea of the comprehensive school had made practically no impact on 
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them, and they did not appear to be interested in spending more money on education.  
He concluded that the name ‘comprehensive schools’ should be changed on the 
grounds that ‘Hitherto it had made little impact on the public and to a small though 
probably influential minority it had distasteful connotations.’ 89   Labour’s whole 
educational programme, he added for good measure, should emphasise opportunity 
for able children rather than a purely egalitarian approach.90  If this could be achieved, 
he suggested, ‘the idea of the comprehensive school could be made popular, 
particularly with working class parents, but its name should in fact be changed’.91   
Seeking to respond to these observations, a further memorandum summing up the 
political implications of Abrams’ survey was circulated to the group.  This noted that 
‘Obviously a great deal more propaganda is necessary to put the idea of the 
comprehensive school across to the public.  Careful thought should perhaps be given 
as to how this is to be done.’92  It went on to suggest that the ‘real appeal’ of the 
comprehensive school lay in stressing the opportunities that these schools offered to 
all children who could benefit from a grammar school education, and ‘manifold’ 
opportunities in other directions for the rest.  It conceded also that to be effective such 
‘propaganda’ would need to be carried on over a long period of time, probably well 
beyond the next general election.93  A policy argued around ‘conventional educational 
improvements’ might win popularity, it concluded, but ‘One that argues on manifestly 
doctrinal or egalitarian grounds could prove unpopular, even among our own 
supporters.’94  The ‘revisionism’ espoused by the Labour Party leadership emphasised 
the need to extend Labour support into the middle classes, but here was a risk that its 
educational policy might tend to alienate not only middle-class opinion but also its 
working-class heartlands. 
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Norman Morris, a lecturer in education at the University of Manchester, deputy chair 
of the Manchester education committee and head of the National Association of 
Labour Teachers, and a key member of the study group, took clear lessons from 
Abrams’ survey, as he declared in a further memorandum to the group:  ‘The case for 
implementing the comprehensive principle must be presented with care.  Doctrinaire 
assertions that secondary education must conform to this or that pattern for ideological 
reasons, only annoy some people and cannot in any case be carried out.’95  Morris 
argued therefore that ‘Our policy should be to say that we want every school to become 
an opportunity school in which every child has access to a wide choice of combinations 
of options within his own school.’96 
The following month, another memorandum posed the question directly about 
changing the name of comprehensive schools, and suggested ‘secondary high school’ 
as a possible alternative.97  It noted also that comprehensive schools in the United 
States seemed to be the source of ‘growing dissatisfaction’, partly it appeared because 
they were not streamed, so that ‘the brightest and the dullest are taught at the same 
pace’. It urged therefore that ‘It might be worth while emphasising that this procedure 
is not in line with most British educational thought and that in the comprehensive 
schools that we envisage, there will be ample opportunity to all children capable of 
doing so of advancing in their studies to the full stretch of their abilities’.98  In the event, 
the study group decided that the name ‘comprehensive school’ should be retained.  
However, it agreed, in partial recognition of Abrams’ findings, that Labour’s policy 
document should refer to ‘comprehensive education’ where possible rather than to 
‘comprehensive schools’.99   
Even this formulation in the minutes of the meeting appear to underplay the 
significance of the discussion.  Morris was in no doubt about this.  More than thirty 
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years later, he wrote to Brian Simon to explain Abrams’ findings and the study group’s 
ultimate reaction to them:  ‘Overwhelmingly, the public wanted no change and 
considered that comprehensive schools lowered standards.  Broken down, Labour 
voters were as anti-comprehensive as the public at large.  We decided to sit on the 
poll.  So far as I know, no one broke silence about it.  It would certainly have been 
used against us!’100  
The following month, a weekend conference was held at the Oulton Hall Hotel, 
Clacton-on-Sea, to discuss and promote Labour’s educational plans with party 
activists, an event with strong propagandist overtones to educate the wider party about 
the new policy in preparation for the policy statement to follow.101  The propagandising 
aspect of educating the public about comprehensive schools was now being 
envisaged in a ’15-20 year perspective’.  Given ‘time and flexibility’, the views reported 
from the weekend conference appeared to be that ‘a comprehensive system of 
education could be achieved, but,,,that the terms of policy should be sufficiently 
camouflaged to avoid a head-on clash with narrow grammar school interests’.102  
Legislation might still be required if persuasion and financial incentives were 
insufficient to win over recalcitrant LEAs, but it appeared that ‘comprehensive 
education, could, over a long period of time, become the major form of education in 
the country, without new legislation’.103  The study group went so far as to rehearse 
the form that legislation might take.  Alternatively, as it observed with some prescience, 
if they relied on persuasion ‘they must accept the fact that a future Conservative 
Government might be less enthusiastic about this policy and realise that it may take 
many years before a comprehensive system of education has established itself’.104   
Even now, there was some reluctance to take this policy forward in a number of 
quarters.  For example, Robert Beloe, the director of education in Surrey, wrote to 
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Gaitskell as late as May 1958 to maintain that the comprehensive school should not 
be regarded as a priority:  ‘First, it just isn’t practicable and efficient in many places.  
Secondly, many people really think it is educationally an unsound unit.’105  Beloe called 
for further study of how to provide the ‘elasticity’ that the tripartite system failed to give.  
Nevertheless, Gaitskell committed the party to the policy that the study group had 
devised, on the basis that it offered the best and most viable solution to a complex 
policy problem. 
Based on the study group’s recommendations, and a detailed policy statement that it 
had drafted on this and a wide range of other areas, Gaitskell launched the Labour 
Party’s new education policy report, Learning to Live, in June 1958.  Chapter four, 
which addressed comprehensive secondary education, emphasised the idea of 
opportunity for all, and insisted that comprehensive education would extend the 
grammar school tradition rather than undermining the quality of work produced in the 
grammar schools.106  The report actually proposed that a Labour Government would 
‘require’ LEAs ‘with all reasonable speed, to adopt the comprehensive principle and 
provide in each secondary school a wide range of courses’.107  It appears that such 
compulsion was only intended to take place if all else failed.  Media responses were 
broadly favourable.  The traditionalist newspaper the Daily Telegraph complained that 
it was a ‘gamble with the schools’, and that comprehensive schools were against the 
spirit of the education system.108  Others were more positive, and the Schoolmaster 
and Woman Teacher’s Chronicle understood and sympathised with its aim to translate 
a coherent philosophy of education into practical politics.109   
Gaitskell himself coined the phrase ‘a grammar school education for all’ in a speech 
at Morden Park, Surrey, on 5 July. 110   This speech, indeed, provided a succinct 
statement of Labour’s general position.  Gaitskell emphasised that he did not wish to 
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abandon grammar school education or the traditions of the grammar school. The aim 
of this policy, he insisted, was to greatly widen opportunities for all children to receive 
what was currently called a grammar school education, and for grammar school 
standards, in the form of higher quality education, to be extended more generally.  He 
was clear that the prevailing segregated system was harmful and that it required 
reform, but equally firm in his view that LEAs should be given latitude, with local 
conditions taken into account.  A single form of comprehensive school was not the 
only answer to the problem, he affirmed; rather, Labour would seek a comprehensive 
system.111  It was this system that Circular 10/65 aimed to promote when Labour 
eventually returned to power. 
5. The great experiment 
 
There is a direct connection between the internal party debates that led to the 
publication of Learning to Live, and the release of Circular 10/65 seven years later.  It 
is true that Labour lost the general election held in October 1959, and a further five 
years were to pass before it won, by a narrow margin, in 1964.  By then, too, Hugh 
Gaitskell had died, and Harold Wilson became party leader and then prime minister in 
his stead.  To some extent the nature of education policy had also moved on over this 
time, with the Ministry of Education now showing an increased interest in intervening 
actively in the school curriculum, much to the alarm of the LEAs. Michael Stewart had 
also moved to another position while in Opposition, this time to housing and local 
government. 
However, when Labour came to power, Wilson turned to Stewart to take charge of 
education, and Stewart was able to take advantage of the time he had spent planning 
for such an opportunity while in Opposition in the late 1950s.  This was certainly the 
26 
 
 
view of Norman Morris as he looked back on these events many years later.  According 
to Morris, Learning to Live, drafted mainly by Stewart, became his ‘blue print’ when he 
took office in 1964.112  Morris insisted that Stewart ‘would have remembered what he 
wrote when he became Secretary of State six years later’. 113   The type of 
comprehensive organisation developed in each locality, he recalled, was ‘less a matter 
of educational philosophy than of practical feasibility’.  Although Circular 10/65 only 
requested rather than directed the LEAs to reorganise their secondary schools, Morris 
concluded, ‘the strategy which we laid down in 1958 was being followed just as we 
had planned’.114  The final decision to ‘request’ rather than require was ultimately a 
‘tactical judgement’.115 
Morris’s memory of these events and his retrospective claims are also borne out by 
Stewart’s account in his autobiography.  Stewart recalled that when he was appointed 
as the secretary of state for education and science, his first Cabinet paper was on his 
plans for comprehensivisation.  In setting out the arguments for the comprehensive 
principle and the different kinds of organisation through which this principle could be 
put into practice, ‘I was following closely the Party pamphlet Learning to Live which I 
had helped to prepare some years before’.116  Stewart was in charge of education for 
only three months before he was moved to the Foreign Office and Anthony Crosland 
took over, but this was the key period in which policy on the comprehensive schools 
was agreed within the Government. 
In the final months of 1964, initial consultation took place on Stewart’s plans.  
Representatives of the National Union of Teachers emphasised their right to be 
consulted on schemes that affected their professional status and livelihood, 
suggesting that increased public interest in education, while welcome, was not always 
well informed.117  The deputy secretary for schools, Wilma Harte, also made clear the 
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strength of the residual opposition to comprehensive schools.  She pointed out that 
opponents would raise objections to the likelihood of comprehensives becoming 
neighbourhood schools and then reflecting the differences between more affluent and 
poorer neighbourhoods within the same city such as London:  ‘In practice parents in, 
say, Putney or Hampstead are not going to send their children to schools in Islington 
or Hackney in order to make room for Islington and Hackney children in Putney and 
Hampstead schools.’118 
By the start of 1965, consultation had progressed to the Cabinet’s social services 
committee, which received a paper proposing that LEAs should be requested to 
reorganise their secondary schools on comprehensive lines. 119   Nevertheless, 
Labour’s plans remained highly controversial and contested.  In January 1965, the 
Conservative Opposition chose to raise the subject of comprehensive education in a 
debate in the House of Commons.  This highlighted the political controversy that 
continued to surround comprehensive education, even though the Conservative 
spokesman for education, Edward Boyle, had some sympathy for this approach.120   It 
was in this debate that Stewart announced his intention to send a circular to LEAs 
asking them to submit plans for the reorganisation of their secondary schools on 
comprehensive lines.121  Stewart advised his Cabinet colleagues before the debate 
that in general the comprehensive principle would need to be implemented by using 
the existing stock of buildings.  He took care to emphasise that this move would 
promote educational opportunities for all children as well as allowing as much latitude 
as possible for LEAs to address local circumstances.122  During the debate itself, on 
21 January 1965, Stewart began his own speech by quoting from Learning to Live, 
observing also that it would not be necessary, at least initially, to amend the 1944 
Act.123 
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It was also at this stage that some of the further consequences of the new policy began 
to be discerned.  A private note to the prime minister a few days before the debate 
pointed out that while the use of existing school buildings made sense in principle, in 
practice it would mean that ‘comprehensive schools will, from the outset, vary in 
efficiency and attractiveness according to the “existing buildings” of which they are 
composed’.  Indeed, ‘To this extent differences of status and “esteem” will be liable to 
be built into the system, and some comprehensive schools will already be “better” than 
others.’124  It was felt that this argument should not be given undue weight, but that 
‘we should be careful of highlighting the fact that comprehensive schools will have to 
be based mainly in existing buildings’.125 
Successive drafts of the new Circular were discussed line by line with interested 
groups in the early months of 1965.  One draft paragraph that attracted particular 
attention, for example, was one on the school community (paragraph 40 in the fourth 
draft of the Circular, eventually revised to become paragraph 36).  The fourth draft of 
the Circular, dated 14 March, noted that poor schools in some areas might come to be 
considered as ‘poor relations’. 126   A number of groups including the National 
Association of Schoolmasters, the County Councils Association and the Headmasters 
Association raised strong objections to this prospect, and noted that any safeguards 
would be likely to be ineffective. 127   This was not a satisfactory outcome of the 
consultation, but DES officials examining the key points that had arisen eventually 
admitted that it was ‘not feasible to say more about these problems in the Circular’.  
Indeed, they noted, ‘Some will be fundamentally insoluble.  In other cases piecemeal 
solutions will be possible; but these are essentially difficulties to be tackled on the 
ground.’128  
6. Conclusions 
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So it was, then, that Circular 10/65 was finally issued on 12 July 1965.  The document 
had emerged from a quarter-century of debate over the comprehensive schools, and 
reflected to some degree the doubts and reservations, as well as the hopes and 
aspirations, that had been expressed during that time.  In many respects it was a 
hidden legacy of the 1944 Act, shaped by the assumptions that underlay the Act and 
produced in accordance with its provisions.  In particular, it was strongly influenced by 
the limited role allocated to the Ministry of Education and the notions of partnership 
underlying the policy regime imbued by the Act. There is much scope for further 
research to be developed on the different groups involved in policies on 
comprehensive education over the past seventy years, employing a wide range of 
sources, methodologies, and theoretical perspectives. 
Above all, and contrary to the idea that the Labour Party in opposition had done little 
planning for this initiative, it had in fact planned it in great detail.  The Gaitskellite 
origins of Circular 10/65 demonstrate the cautious and avowedly realistic nature of 
Labour’s policy.  They highlight also the fundamental doubts about the future of 
comprehensive schools that had been harboured throughout the debate.  The fate of 
Abrams’ survey of 1957 was to be excluded from the subsequent discussion, but it still 
helped to reinforce the emphasis on ability and opportunity, as distinct from equality, 
that was developed in Learning to Live and in the policy debates that followed.  It 
provides an interesting example of public opinion polling at an early stage in its 
development and of the political decision making that resulted from it.  In the light of 
these arguments and the nature of their resolution, it is the contribution of Michael 
Stewart rather than that of Anthony Crosland that comes to the fore. 
Here also is the answer to Simon’s key question about Labour’s supposed lack of 
strength of purpose and political will.  The Labour leadership was persuaded that 
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separatism and the eleven-plus examination must be ended, but addressed the 
constraints of the regime introduced by the 1944 Act and the likely expense of rapid 
comprehensivisation with a pragmatic and measured approach.  Underlying this also 
were residual reservations about the comprehensive school as a policy and a 
preference for diversity that had been inherited from earlier policy makers.  It drew on 
a wide range of strands of opinion within the party, from strong commitment to doubt, 
equivocation and resistance.  In doing so, it succeeded in channelling a potentially 
very expensive commitment into practical reform.   
At the same time, the Labour Party’s cautious reformism also helps to explain the 
limitations in the policy reform that ultimately emerged with Circular 10/65.  The 
acceptance that existing buildings would have to be used in implementing the ‘great 
experiment’ meant that social differences between different local areas became an 
increasingly evident factor in determining inequalities in secondary education.  
Arguably it was this geographical and social dimension underpinning secondary 
education policy that began to fuel opposition and the development of new 
alternatives.  As Labour’s study group had anticipated as early as 1957, subsequent 
Conservative governments remained unconvinced by comprehensive education.  By 
the end of the century, a new Labour government under Tony Blair became 
determined to ‘modernise’ the comprehensive schools, and initiatives to reintroduce 
choice and diversity regained centre stage. 129   The apogee of comprehensive 
education as a national policy contained internal tensions that would return to haunt it 
in the decades to come. 
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